23
January, 2018
pub
1Feb18
Power Resilience
Electricity
is the most versatile form of energy produced by the industrial revolution, but
our power infrastructure of centralized production and grid distribution has
not changed in over 140 years. Electricity
is produced as needed, so the system must be built to meet peak demand, and is otherwise
underutilized. Storing utility scale
power has been limited to pump storage, where water is pumped to an elevated
lake using nonpeak power, and runs downhill through generators as needed.
New battery
developments allow storage to be scaled to specific needs and locations, complementing
renewable power, which produces when wind or sun are present, rather than as
power is needed. However, any system
with centralized power production and grid distribution is vulnerable to outage,
from natural as well as man-made causes.
It has been four months since the winds of hurricane Maria destroyed the
power system on Puerto Rico, and half the country is still without power. Many countries have intermittent power due to
failed economics systems or war.
In
September, 1859, the Earth experienced the largest solar flare on record, the
Carrington Event. This mass of highly
charged particles caused Aurora Borealis as far south as Cuba and Hawaii. The event caused little damage at that time,
but would be devastating today, because induced high currents in the grid system
would destroy hundreds of major transformers critical to the system. These custom transformers cost as much as $7M
each, and require years to fabricate. Electrical
outages would be widespread and prolonged, with rural areas last on the list of
priorities.
Solar flares
can happen any time, but can be detected in time to shut down the grid, as has
been suggested for high winds. This
would require investment in solar monitoring, and the shutdown could affect
much of the planet.
Another
natural hazard to the grid, particularly in California, is earthquakes. In 1971, the Sylmar quake in southern
California, destroyed the newly opened California Intertie, a high voltage DC
line carrying hydro power from the Pacific Northwest to Los Angeles. In Ukiah, the Maacama Fault forms the eastern
edge of the valley, an extension of the Rodgers and Hayward Faults further to
the south. These run parallel to the San
Andreas Fault, and also relieve the stress of plate motion in this part of the
continent. The Hayward last moved in
1868, and is "due" for another shock any time, based on historical
averages. This fault system produces
smaller events than the San Andreas (magnitude 6.8 vs. 7.9), but we live closer
to the fault line, so the effect would be amplified. It is likely that such an earthquake would
damage the local grid system.
Ukiah gets
most of its power from the geysers in Sonoma county. The generators are near the fault line and could
be damage. Tectonic shifts could change
the distribution of heat for the geyser field, requiring new wells to be
drilled. There is no way to predict
earthquakes, and no way to protect the system against disruption. In such an event, less densely populated
areas such as ours would not be top priority for repairs.
Man-made
outages could occur due to a nuclear attack generated electromagnetic pulse
(EMP), which would cause all computer electronics to short out, and induce destructive
currents in the gird.
A new
vulnerability is the threat of cyber-weapons, hostile software inserted into
the grid system to destroy equipment. In
2010, the Stuxnet virus infected computer systems worldwide. It was apparently developed by the US and
Israel to destroy centrifuges in Iran's nuclear enrichment facility, but the
design allowed it to spread everywhere. This sophisticated cyber-weapon is now available
for other bad actors to use. For more
information, see "Zero Days", a documentary that can be streamed on
Hulu.
The
vulnerabilities of centralized production and grid distribution could be reduced
by increasing local production and storage, which are currently limited in the
county. We could start by addressing emergency
communication needs for fire and police, to support operations completely
independent of grid power. We could
expand to cover vital services for the entire community, including fuel, food,
hospitals, and cell towers.
I have
already talked about the advantage of distributed production and storage at the
household level for fire resilience. The
beauty of investing in local production and storage for the community is that
these systems are able to provide power under normal situations, and are not
disrupted in an emergency. The added
bonus is that we move our community toward lower carbon emissions and greater
self-reliance, improving our chances of even having a future.
